and community-based health and personal care services, decrease the use of institutional services, and bring down overall spending on long-term care services. 4 The federal government approved the CFC waiver in June 2005,6 explicitly endorsing this new definition of long-term care entitlement in its approval letter:
CFC "[piromotes the objectives of the Medicaid program and the Americans with Disabilities Acts by creating an entitlement of home and community-based services, for a group with the highest needs, within the long-term care infrastructure.
Experience gained through this demonstration may pave the way for other states seeking to reduce the institutional bias of Medicaid." 6 Albert Blow, a former security guard who was stricken by a heart attack and stroke, I knows about this institutional bias. His medical condition landed him in a nursing home for what he hoped was short-term rehabilitation.' But because he could not afford to spend his limited Social Security and pension checks on maintaining his apartment and car, a few months turned into many, and his options for leaving the Starr Farm Nursing Home dwindled. 9 One day in 2004, he called his former wife and told her, "if I had a gun, I would shoot myself." 10 However, when Vermont's CFC came into being, Mr. Blow went back to his own place."
With Section 1115 authorization, Vermont paid his former wife, who was a former licensed nurse, $9.27 an hour to care for him. 12 Having this choice gave the 71-year-old man a new lease on life.' 3 CFC has had the opposite effect on the nursing home industry in Vermont. "We knew that this was probably the death knell for some of our nursing homes," said Mary Shriver, executive director of the Vermont Health Care Association.
See THE U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., LONG-TERM CARE SYSTEMS CHANGE FOR THE AGED AND AMERICANS
14 Long-term care analysts, while recognizing the inevitable changes that would result from the new Medicaid entitlement, have questioned whether the non-institutional setting urged by CFC truly benefits Vermont's seniors and whether it really is more cost-effective than traditional Medicaid-funded institutional care.1 5 For example, nursing homes provide the availability of round-the-clock care, while CFC recipients typically receive only twenty-five to thirty hours of care a week, which often is not provided on nights and weekends. 6 In addition, government regulations require nursing homes to have basic safety infrastructure like fire alarms and sprinkler systems, and quality assurance mechanisms like licensed care providers. 17 More fundamentally, given the mobility of younger generations throughout the United States and the resulting dearth of nearby family members to care for the elderly, even with compensation, some analysts question the CFC's reach." Given the hospital industry's "quicker and sicker" discharge mantra, direct discharge to nursing homes may often appear preferable than this fragile, home-based infrastructure. 9 As Justice Brandeis famously wrote over a hundred years ago, " [i] term care service design, which may "pave the way" 27 for a more coherent and cohesive system. 28 As one of the first states to receive a Section 1115 waiver to reorganize the long-term elder care delivery, 29 into home and community settings? Has it spurred the establishment of new institutions, like adult day care and assisted-or independent-living facilities, and has it reshaped the home health care industry?
Second, there are questions concerning the program's costeffectiveness. Is CFC managing long-term care costs and saving Vermont money? If so, is it using those savings to serve more people?
Third, there are questions concerning whether CFC has actually created additional costs.
Given low Medicaid reimbursement rates, have shifts in utilization and attendant savings resulted in new or increased costs for providers via increased acuity of nursing home patients and bad debt for home health care agencies?
Finally, there is the fundamental question of whether CFC will radically change long-term care and influence other states. Is the program really "turning the ship around," as Wendy FoxGrange, senior policy advisor with the AARP's Public Policy Institute, observed? 40 Will the Vermont program serve as a program model for reforming Medicaid's long-term care entitlement?
This article seeks to answer these questions and in doing so, to move the conversation beyond the beneficial individual choice that CFC entitled Albert Blow to make to the large-scale impact of such entitlement shifting. As the Baby Boomers begin to join the aging population, 41 finding financially sustainable solutions to long-term care is necessary for our country's health and well-being, and for Medicaid's promise of health care entitlement to long-term care. over the landscape of the federal government's health care financing decisions for long-term care, "It's a crazy situation.
[The government guarantees the] service people don't want and is more expensive, while the service people prefer and is cheaper [is not guaranteed]." 42 According to one study, Medicaid paid $122 a day for Vermont nursing home care in 2002, compared to $80 a day for community-based care. 43 Yet, since Medicaid's inception in the 1960s, federal law has created an entitlement to nursing home services while largely choosing to exclude coverage of community-based care." "Medicaid accounts for 40% of all long-term care services delivered and almost half of all nursing home expenditures in the United States, making Medicaid the nation's largest single payer of long-term care services."
45
In 2005, Medicaid spent $38 billion, or 82% of its long-term care budget, on institutional care, and only $8 billion, or 18% of this budget, on community-based care. 46 The current federal administration has labeled this policy choice as Medicaid's "institutional bias." 47 The impact of this bias is magnified by Medicaid's interplay with the Medicare program. 48 Minnesota, and New Hampshire responded to these same problems by clamping down on the pool of eligibles through stricter asset transfer rules, Vermont instead sought to reduce costs while enhancing consumer satisfaction. 55 In CFC, Vermont sought the federal government's approval to (1) make home and community-based services a mandatory benefit for all Medicaid enrollees needing long-term care and (2) provide limited community-based care to state residents "at risk" of needing long-term care. 56 Cost reduction features include: (1) an overall spending cap for long-term care services, (2) limitations on clinical eligibility standards, and (3) a waiting list for some categories of eligible individuals. In 2004, the General Assembly of the State of Vermont enacted a bill endorsing the Section 1115 waiver request. 8 One year later, it enacted a bill implementing the federally approved waiver. 59 While each act differs in focus, they hold in common two foundational principles for how CFC should function: careful transition of those people already eligible for long-term care services and reinvestment of potential savings.
6 0 Both acts require DAIL to "implement the waiver in such a manner as to assure that any individual receiving services on the date the waiver becomes effective shall continue to receive appropriate services as assessed under the level of care criteria in effect prior to the waiver. In contrast, Vermont experienced mixed first-year results in achieving its goal of changing Medicaid's institutional bias toward long-term care services. Despite the stated goal of moving enrollees from nursing homes into home-based care, there was actually a modest increase of 2% in nursing home patients by June 2006.90 Home and community-based service recipients, however, increased by 15%, and enhanced residential care recipients increased by a whopping 50%. 91 Two years of data more strongly indicate that Vermont has begun turning its own institutional bias ship around. In the last year, the number of Medicaid recipients receiving services in 
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[Vol. 9 home and community-based settings increased by almost 300, or about 20%, the largest increase ever. 92 In addition, the number of CFC enrollees receiving long-term care in an institutional setting declined by 250 between October 2005 and October 2007.93 Some of these enrollees transitioned into enhanced residential care settings, while others went into home and community-based services. 94 Regardless of the non-institutional setting in which they ended up, the one they left felt the impact: during this same two-year period, nursing home capacity in Vermont decreased by 140 beds. 9 5 As the line graph in Figure 3 suggests, these twin trends of declining enrollment in nursing homes and increasing use of home and community-based settings will continue under the CFC entitlement structure. 96 In its first two years, CFC appears to have achieved its first two goals of increasing the use of home and community-based care and decreasing the use of nursing homes. However, statistics from October 2007 indicate that the third stated goal of lowering overall spending on long-term care has not yet been attained. 97 Instead, as the graph in Figure 4 illustrates, Medicaid expenditures have continued to rise, with an overall increase of $30 million in both nursing home and community settings since
2000.98
What about the theory that decreased use of institutional care would result in cost savings that would not be eclipsed by increased use of lesser-cost community-based services? As of 2007, 70% of CFC expenditures went to nursing homes even though only 55% of the Highest Need and High Need enrollees 92. HILL, supra note 37, at 1. Notably, this positive experience has not been hampered by a sudden increase in enrollee numbers that would cause an unsustainable cost increase. Id. at 13. See Appx. Figure 2. 93. Nursing home expenses have increased by about 3%101 while home and community-based services expenses have increased by 40%, and enhanced residential care by about 80%.102 Variable uses of these services by county suggests some room for more movement away from the institutional setting and possibly some additional savings, but it is not clear how much this transition would contribute to achieving the overall goal of decreasing the state's overall Medicaid spending on long-term care.
In the end, the ultimate way to measure the quality and sustainability of a long-term care system is to ask whether it provides a continuum of services in settings ranging from the home to the nursing home, so that individuals receive care in the most clinically appropriate and cost-effective setting. At this level, CFC appears to be a resounding success. The state pays for services provided in an array of long-term care service settings, and an increasing number of Vermont elders are eligible to receive them under Medicaid.
103 Moreover, as the bar graph in Figure 6 suggests, participation rates in the various programs indicate that the most intensive service settings are being used by the oldest, and arguably most medically needy, 99. Id. at 23.
Id.

101.
Id. These services have a statewide average cost of $3,488 per plan of care. Id. at 32. Notably, home and community-based care costs vary widely by county due to such factors as the degree of reliance on unpaid caregiving, varying use of home health agency services instead of consumer or surrogate-directed services, the number of personal care hours authorized, higher usage of adult day care services, and use of other payor sources for home health services. Id.
102. Id. at 23. See id. at 33 (noting that enhanced residential care (ERC) services have a statewide average cost of $2,165 per plan of care, or 40% less than the cost of home-based care. The range of ERC service costs are smaller than that for HCBS care, given that adult day care services are not included and that plans are based on reimbursement tiers that do not represent a specific number of hours of personal care). See also Appx. Figure 5. state residents. 10
While there is no available data to assess the fairness of the screening process used to determine which enrollees are deemed Highest Need and High Need, 0 the first two years of directing CFC enrollees into a long-term care setting does not show obvious anomalies. In this way, the experience to date would seem to agree with the observation that "Vermont's approach clearly is a more enlightened approach and broadens the dialog about possible methods of modifying health care approaches." 0 6 What is less clear is CFC's long-term impact on the provider community, especially nursing homes and home health care agencies. The stated goal of reducing the number of nursing homes has already been met with the net reduction of 140 beds in the first two years. 0 7 While it was never envisioned that nursing homes would completely disappear, despite Commissioner Flood's characterization of them as outdated models, the state certainly imagines them changing as the CFC experiment continues. 0 Notably, the Vermont legislature created a Task Force on the Sustainability of Nursing Homes in the act implementing CFC to help the DAIL Commissioner develop statewide recommendations on the future of Vermont's nursing homes.1 09 It was legislatively directed to consider such questions as: the transition issues for nursing homes as more individuals use home-and community-based longterm care services, how nursing homes can convert the services offered to provide long-term care services differently, unmet needs for nursing home services for 104. HLL, supra note 37, at 26. See Appx. Figure 6 . 105. Notably there were two long-term care ombudsmen positions created to play the "watchdog" role over the waiver program, which are required to report complaints to the legislature each year. The jury is still out on these questions. Likewise, although the first two years of experience show a continued trend in rising costs for nursing home care, 111 the data is unclear about the reasons for it. One hypothesis is that rising patient acuity is fueling this increase, because as healthier elders seek home and community-based care, sicker patients require more intensive institutional services.
In contrast to documented concerns about CFC's effect on nursing homes, relatively few problems were anticipated with home health care providers.
112
Given the emphasis on homebased care, one would have anticipated a boom in home health agency Medicaid revenues. In fact, the opposite has occurred: in fiscal year 2006, the Vermont Assembly of Home Health Agencies reported almost $2 million in losses on about $12 million of CFC revenues.
113
One reason for this loss could be the lack of fit between the agencies' cost structure and CFC reimbursement rates, which have been set for "consumer-directed" care. Recall the $9.27 per hour paid to Mr. Blow's ex-wife. With higher overhead due primarily to the cost of complying with various governmental regulations, home health agencies like the non-profit Visiting Nurse Associations are at a competitive disadvantage. In the long-term, CFC could change the shape of the state's home health care industry, for these agencies cannot underwrite Probably most importantly, whether CFC can truly pave a way away from Medicaid's traditional institutional bias in longterm care appears to largely depend on whether Vermont's current supply of home care helpers will hold out. Currently, no data suggests that the numbers have dwindled. Given the relatively low amount of industrialization and paucity of highwage jobs, Vermont's labor supply of $10 per hour home care workers appears elastic. Still, the question remains whether this capacity is available in other states, especially in light of the broader demographic trend of a declining younger population with increasing geographic mobility. These population trends strongly suggest that a model built on young caregivers will have difficulty sustaining itself. 15 "BUILD IT AND THEY WILL COME"" 6 Traditional Medicaid gave clear incentives to build and staff nursing homes. Now, the newly constructed entitlement in Vermont's CFC builds home and community-based structures that are more self-directed and thus harder to assess and regulate. The data to determine whether CFC provides a role model for rebuilding long-term care services across the United States are still preliminary, but hold promise. After two years, one can unequivocally conclude that CFC is delivering longterm care in home and community-based settings to a greater proportion of Vermont's Medicaid recipients. This upward trend is predicted to continue, while the proportion of state HR_3865_and_S_2181_Oct_07.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2008 115. This is clearly a concern that Vermont policymakers are tracking closely. Two recent studies on the topic recommend annual inflationary increases. DAIL is currently working on an in-depth study of current wages and benefits.
WASSERMAN, supra note 31, at iv.
FIELD OF DREAMS (Gordon Co. 1989).
residents cared for in nursing homes is predicted to decline. In addition, the program has had enough funding to provide home and community-based care to an expansion group of less clinically needy patients, anticipating that these services will diminish the need for institutional care in the short and longterms. These results merit emulation. But other data from this two-year experiment point to several open questions, which will require more time to answer. CFC is reshaping the landscape of long-term care providers, with resulting industry effects both intended, on nursing homes, and unintended, on home health agencies." 7 Moreover, the initial success in shifting care away from institutions does not provide a clear answer to the cost trade-off between nursing home and home and community-based care."" To date, Vermont has not shown that CFC has solved the overall longterm care spending problem."' Likewise, the question of whether expanding home and community-based services for those on the eligibility edge successfully staves off their eventual admission to a nursing home is still an open one. Finally, the demographic question about the home care provider pool underlines the fact that the experience of CFC, as a very small 2 0 state experiment, might be hard to replicate in other states.
The clear result of this "novel social and economic experiment" 21 is that states with Section 1115 waivers become Medicaid policymakers, in fact at the cutting edge of Medicaid policy design. At some level, this may seem like a proper recalibration 2 2 of the state-federal partnership that is Medicaid. Certainly in the long-term care arena, no one would debate that Medicaid's historical focus on delivering service in nursing homes was short-sighted, at best. It seems likely that in this era of federalism, few would debate the premise that states are better equipped to understand its population's needs and the local sensibility for meeting them.
In the spirit of Justice Brandeis' famous quote, experimenting with long-term care benefit design in Vermont "without risk to the rest of the country," and then applying the lessons learned to the overall Medicaid program, would seem a happy marriage of state and federal form and function.1 23 From this vantage point, Vermont's CFC experiment certainly provides excellent anecdotal and analytical information on both utilization and cost, to "pave the way" for other states.1 24 And given the federal cap, Vermont's decision to seek ways to expand the reach of Medicaid's long-term care entitlement in the face of state financial risk shows the kind of courage that Justice Brandeis envisioned.
But is it possible that, while experimenting to meet consumer service demands and state administrative flexibility desires, we might also be quietly moving away from the federal nature of the Medicaid entitlement? CMS's approval letter to Vermont officials provides a subtle clue: "Experience gained But what if, in the next few years, this aging state spurs long-term care service demands that exceed the capped funds? Vermont would then have to make the hard choice between narrowing eligibility and expanding the use of state tax revenues. To cut back on eligibility means compromising on the belief that providing home and community-based services is the best way to provide long-term care to Vermont's elders. To raise more state funds via taxes means recognizing that the federal Medicaid "match" was insufficient to sustain this method of care delivery and asking state taxpayers for more.
Regardless of the ultimate choice, the need to make it underscores the fact that states like Vermont have been put in the driver's seat of Medicaid policymaking. Federal waivers are intended to try out innovations at a smaller-than-national level, to permit CMS to learn how to design a better federal entitlement without putting the entire program in jeopardy. 128 If, however, the results of CFC only pave the way for other states to individually redesign their long-term care entitlement, then Medicaid's federal natural is called into question.
In this fashion, the state experiment, while intended to strengthen the quality and expand the breadth of long-term care 126. See, e.g., GUYER, supra note 34, at 1 (noting that Governor Douglas stated that the state sought the Global Commitment waiver because of "state fiscal problems and the desire for more flexibility to change the Medicaid program without federal review.").
127. In the case of the CFC section 1115 waiver, Vermont officials seek to use excess funds left after treating the highest need and high need groups to expand service to treat the moderate need group, thereby using Medicaid funds to serve the health care needs of low income residents. See LONG-TERM CARE PLAN, supra note 63, at 1-2. In contrast, the Global Commitment Section 1115 waiver provides the state with discretion to use a portion of the Medicaid block fund for non-Medicaid health spending. GUYER, supra note 34, at 2 (noting that Vermont has already identified fifty different programs which may use the excess funds, including "tobacco cessation programs, domestic violence initiatives, and the state's medical school and public laboratory.").
128
. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315.
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[Vol. 9 service design, risks weakening the sense and limiting the depth of federal responsibility for it. Certainly, this result is more subtle and hazy on the horizon, compared to many states' current budget woes in the face of increased Medicaid spending on long-term care. Vermont made a courageous choice to tackle its shortfalls by shifting the locus of care and providing more of it, not less, despite clear financial risk shifting from the federal government. Hopefully, as the results of CFC become clearer over the next two years, the federal government will make a similar, courageous choice to permit all Medicaid recipients to benefit from this long-term care redesign. 
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